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Abstract 
There is a wide gap between planning ideology and planning practice in some regimes. In 
planning practice, contextual differences and traditional practices affect urban spatial 
configurations and their related societal dimensions, and also influence the legislative and 
administrative systems that dictate the process and production of the built environment. This is 
linked to situations where hidden practices and power relations among key actors may limit 
democratic participation in the planning process and challenge ethical practice. This paper 
focuses on the emerging traditions of planning practice in Turkey. We argue that by 
understanding the role(s) of the key actors in the process and investigating approval processes 
in detail, it can become evident that planning ‘on the ground’ is often tokenistic and 
circumvented by hegemonic power relations and tactical actions. These latter in turn side-step 
a requirement for democratic participation and encourage a ‘loosening’ of planning ethics.  
 
Word count: 10357 (for the main document excluding references) 
 
1. Introduction 
Cities which were formed under the impacts of industrialism are now embroiled in monetary 
turmoil, with strategies of global financial capital fostering inter-local and intensified inter-
urban competition (Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw, 2000). This has resulted in deregulation, 
privatization and financial austerity. These cities have also become dependent on inherited 
forms of urban governance (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The various stimuli have led 
policymakers to focus on the built environment primarily as an investment opportunity and 
‘geographical space’ has come to feature ‘on the economic and political agenda as never 
before’ (Smith, 2008, p.5). Over this period property relations, intergovernmental relations and 
legal frameworks have shaped and reshaped planning practices and cultures in favour of this 
imperative (Booth, 2005). The relentless aim to compete in the global economy, both at 
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national and local level, has shifted decision-making in spatial planning, creating a transition 
from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989); or more simply expressed, 
development promotion (in the interests of private capital), rather than development regulation 
in the wider democratic interest (Fainstein, 1991). This approach ignores long-term 
consequences and has functioned neither as a ‘placebo’ nor a ‘panacea’ in the regeneration of 
local economies, leading instead to land speculation and short-term growth benefits (Turok, 
1992), as governments developed different mechanisms to fulfil the needs of real estate capital 
(Weber, 2002). This has been particularly true in Turkey, especially starting from 1980 and 
more particularly after 2000 to present, where such mechanisms have been developed with 
some rapidity due to the interventionalist nature of the state, that is strengthened via different 
types of capital used at different levels and capacities. Over this period, there was increased 
commodification of the built environment and urban development tools were used as a way to 
improve the commodity as an investment asset. Power relations were also transformed, and 
urban planning and networking power were recast as ‘big business’ and ‘dominant interest 
groups have been articulated with the traditional forms of representation by using new 
channels’ (Sengul, 1993 cited in Ersoy, 2001). Therefore, we argue that it is also critically 
relevant not to ignore the intertwined and dynamic nature of power, since ‘city-making is about 
making choices, applying values, using politics to turn values into policies and exerting power 
to get your way … Power determines the kind of cities we have and politics is its medium’ 
(Landry, 2006, p. 14). Planning may be conceived as an interactive and communicative activity 
(Sandercock, 1998), an institutionally embedded practice (Friedman, 2005), the ideal good 
within the physical world (Gunder, 2003); however, such theories fall short in their capacity to 
account for all contexts at all times. 
As stated by Brenner & Theodore (2002, p. 21) cities have been transformed into ‘important 
geographical targets and institutional laboratories’ which in turn foster planning praxis1 that is 
an ‘institutionally embedded practice’, generating culturally-dynamic contexts (Friedman 
2005, p.29), having permeable, unpredictable boundaries within social, economic and political 
spheres (Sanyal, 2005), and which also draw on accumulative as well as peculiar practices. 
Therefore, the globalised theory of planning is limited in its ability to respond to the 
multifarious nature of cities, and lacks recognition of the importance of ‘culture’ (Othengrafen, 
2010). This paper therefore aims to contribute to criticisms of the supposed ‘universality’ of 
Western-centric planning theories and adds to the call to challenge the contextual bias and to 
                                                          
1 By referring to the word praxis in some parts instead of practice we aim to refer to the synthesis of theory with practice. 
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de-provincialisation of the urban planning theories (Robinson, 2011; Roy, 2009; Tulumello, 
2015), via critical reflection on the long-celebrated theories of communicative and 
participatory planning, and elaborates the criticism through power-centred approaches 
supporting a detailed exemplification of the ‘real rationality’2 of the planning experience in 
Turkey.   
Urban development driven by commercial property and its associated planning practices seems 
the best locus for an analysis of hegemonic power relations; in particular, the dominant form 
of commercial property represented by shopping malls.  Reflecting this, the case study concerns 
the aggressive urban development that took place more than ever since the beginning of 2000s 
through the emergence and later boom in new shopping malls in the capital city. Two cases 
have been selected, Armada I and II, and Kentpark, in order to uncover the real actors in spatial 
planning practices, how they communicate with each other, and how planning processes unfold 
in reality. The aim is to reveal both hidden and visible relations and practices among actors 
through dialogues that are generated in the course of conflict, and/or caused by, conflict. This 
paper unfolds planning practice in Turkey, where a particular set of context-dependent 
conditions and their attendant daily solutions have become endemic.  
 
2. Power over planning: capital as a powerful source 
Urban planning is both a political and a professional practice (Low, 1991) that produces and 
reproduces urban space. Although ideally planning aims for democratic social change 
(Forester, 1989) as a moral practice and a technical and a utopian discourse (Friedman, 1989), 
it has gained increasing orientation towards urban entrepreneurialism and consumption-
oriented place promotion (Eraydın & Tasan-Kok, 2013; Peck, 2005; Peck et al., 2009;) and 
towards operating as an apparatus of neoliberal spatial governance (Allmendinger & Haughton, 
2013). Therefore, although agreeing with Gunder’s optimistic vision for planning as ‘the 
expert’s realm of true essence or idea, striving to partake of the ideal good within the physical 
world’ (2003, p. 238), we find that it often fails to deliver in reality. This is because, with regard 
to urban development, the practice of planning frequently ends up serving the political 
economy, ‘on the side of those with power, specifically powers of the state’ (Friedman, 1989, 
p.129). Therefore, the reality of planning, which ‘often disappoints’ (Hillier 2002, p. 3), is that 
                                                          
2 Concept proposed by Flyvbjerg 1998-2002 for exploring the relations between power and rationality. 
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it has become an instrument crafted in the image of the ‘dark side’3 of the praxis and power 
relations within (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002), while reflecting the 
widening gap between idealized practice and the reality of planning. Power also has a ‘slippery 
and ever-changing’ nature, is capable of adapting and camouflaging itself (Dovey, 1999, p. 
16), and is therefore an elusive concept (Booher & Innes, 2002). It requires a nuanced analysis, 
as it is mobilised and transmuted across history, culture, authorities, institutions and relations 
and shapes conditions around itself. Consequently, through its intangible – and in some 
instances veiled – nature, power is capable of running in the background of the production of 
urban space. Therefore, in its multi-layered forms it is produced in various ways in daily life, 
starting from state power (institutional and statutory) to individual power or to a combination 
of both while capturing through different types of capital4 circulating ‘through the built 
environment in a dynamic and erratic fashion’ (Weber, 2002, p.173). Therefore, we argue that 
the variety of different types of power inherently require different types of capital, that both 
produces for the processes and becomes the product as the outcomes of production, which are 
bounded within the planning practice process, where the planning itself is considered as a state 
apparatus that legalises the production of the built environment. Thus, in planning practice, not 
only do contextual differences and traditional practice affect urban spatial configurations and 
their related societal dimensions, but additionally, they shape the legislative and administrative 
systems and their operations which dictate the process and production of the built environment. 
Thus, each culture naturally generates its own planning environment. 
 
2.1. Communication versus power: suggestions coming from theory and critiques 
Following liberal and neoliberal changes and transformations in the late twentieth century, 
planning lost its traditional statutory and prescriptive power (Healey, 1992), giving way to 
more loosely-defined approaches in the West, with a specific focus on collaboration and 
participation (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1996; Innes, 1995). The Habermasian communicative 
approach was presented as a way of suggesting common principles that should be accepted to 
generate communicative exchange and collaboration (Albrechts, 2003; Booher & Innes, 2002; 
Forester, 1989; Healey, 1996; Hillier, 2002; Innes, 1995) and within this orientation the 
                                                          
3 This term is used by various scholars to distinguish the idealized steps and stated intentions of the decision-makers from what is 
happening in reality in planning.  
4 Other than economic capital, other forms of capital are also prominent, for example social capital, which, as Bourdieu argues, represents 
networking capacity and relationships, and ‘which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a 
credential’ capital that is a dynamic reserve to be used later when needed in practice (1986, p. 248).   
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position of the planner focuses on mediation (Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Tewdwr-Jones and 
Allmendinger, 1998). Therefore, at the centre of attention is the moral obligation of the planner 
and the planner’s ‘thought’ (consisting of the interaction of values–behaviours and ideals) as 
those of an expert, working prior to action (Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). However, this positioning 
of the planner has a rather romantic quality for some cultures, where the reality of practice 
makes it unlikely to succeed. This is because planners are not the only agency of planning 
practice (and even sometimes are the least powerful). This approach also underestimates the 
subtle empowerment of other actors and the power plays among them, and undervalues the true 
nature of the capitalist condition and the strong structural position of the state, its institutions 
and actors (with direct and indirect interest claims) within the planning process. The form of 
communication that emerges therefore resembles the empowerment of already powerful.   
The communicative and collaborative approaches also give little attention to the already 
existing distortions generated via accumulative practices, as well as overlooking cultural 
differences, and a way of dealing with things that arises from the context, and which becomes 
normalized through time and are even converted into planning tradition. Therefore, regardless 
of the good intentions of planners, the real decision-making may come about through non-
communicative processes (Flyvberg & Richardson, 2002; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; 
Yiftachel, 1998), as well as through tacit structures, taken-for-granted assumptions and 
unwritten patterns of power (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015). In essence, the asymmetrical 
relation between power and rationality coexists with rationality dominated by power relations, 
with the result that in democracy and planning go ‘astray’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p.357). Therefore, 
democratic participation and ethical practice may be limited, as the practice itself is driven by 
powerful mechanisms (Tasan-Kok et al., 2016) that leave planners powerless. Thus, as will be 
seen through our case studies, communication can become notional and ineffective, even in 
some cases leading towards further empowering the already powerful. This situation on the 
one hand challenges ethical planning practice and on the other, limits democratic participation, 
given that deficiencies of the former will distort the nature of the latter, a matter which, for us, 
goes beyond mere corruption. 
However, despite the weaknesses of power-centred approaches in terms of providing solutions 
rather than mere narratives (Forester, 2001); and even though communicative and collaborative 
approaches have been promoted in a universalizing way as ‘the theory’5; we would argue the 
                                                          
5 See Roy, 2009, p.7 for discussion about planning theories where ‘a theory’ is promoted as ‘the theory’ yet is not capable of encompassing 
the situation for all cultures at all times.  
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latter are ‘too idealistic and often unrealistic’ (Yiftachel, 1998, p.297) and therefore may only 
pertain to particular parts of the globe (Huxley & Yiftachael, 2000). The planning practice 
responsible for the production–reproduction and organisation of urban space, and thus 
inherently operating as a state apparatus, in reality becomes vulnerable to power relations and 
ethical distortions while, at the same time, as a strong and active partner, it is subsumed in 
power relations rather than providing a smooth ground for instituting idealised planning 
theories. 
 
3. Planning practice in the Turkish context 
The city … is the point of maximum concentration for the power 
and culture of a community (Mumford 1938, p. 3). 
Turkey has a long and complex history; however, in recent times two key periods of 
political/economic restructuring have occurred, between 1980 and 2000, and 2000 to present. 
These two periods represent a move from centralization to decentralization, and a subsequent 
recentralization, relating to government interventions which have altered both the urban 
management structure and condition of planning. This has resulted in urban populism, 
contributing to the desire for rapid urban development and its attendant boost to construction, 
and led to a significant focus on metropolitan centres (Istanbul and Ankara being the most 
prominent examples) as the representatives of internationalism ‘and as the most likely bases of 
its clientelistic networks and electoral appeal’ (Keyder & Oncu, 1994, p. 400). Cities became 
an investment arena especially starting from 1980’s due to liberal policy restructurings; and 
‘non-material resources which do not have immediate monetary costs’ and ‘selective 
implementation of regulatory powers of local government’ instilled a sense that the regulatory 
systems regarding the built environment might ‘be relaxed, modified … in response to 
particularistic and individualistic demands’ (Oncu, 1988, p. 44–45). Although in this period 
the local administration system was reformed (towards decentralization) and a two-tier 
municipal system was introduced (with metropolitan and district municipalities), this change 
in local administrative hierarchy, in practice, resulted in the creation of an ‘all-powerful 
metropolitan mayoralty’ (Keyder & Oncu, 1994: 405). The decentralization of powers over the 
built environment also brought about additional conflicts at the local level due to different 
representations of interests; these have in effect weakened the planning system. In the same 
period, as Oc and Tiesdell stated ‘… planning decisions [were] often transparently distorted or 
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biased in favour of powerful individuals and businesses or [were] expedient populist measures 
to engineer political support’ (1994, p.108–109). Projects for privatization through government 
tenders and additional financial incentives emerged; thus, the practice of the decision-making 
process was reconfigured.  Power relations were also transformed and urban planning and 
networking power became big business; thus ‘dominant interest groups have been articulated 
with the traditional forms of representation by using new channels’ (Sengul, 1993 cited in 
Ersoy, 2001). 
The period following 2000 to present witnessed further aggressive development of the built 
environment with the construction sector seen as the main pillar of the country’s economic 
growth. Holding power at the central government level from the beginning of this period, the 
aim of the AKP administration [ruling party since 2002] has been to manage the built 
environment through a maximally interventionist approach, using its authoritarian and 
statutory power to issue legislation that smooths the path for market forces and international 
capital in construction and urban development projects. These have also become a tool for 
capturing public attention around forthcoming elections, through generating electoral promises 
based on these projects. Following 2000s, further changes were enacted in relation to the 1980s 
decentralization approach that gave greater powers to the metropolitan municipality, with the 
mayor as the city-boss. Beginning in 2004 (with the enactment of Law for Metropolitan 
Municipalities no. 5216) and in 2005 (with the enactment of the Municipality Law no. 5393), 
and continuing with changes to the latter in 2010 (enactment of Law no. 5998: Law on Making 
Amendments to the Municipality Law), metropolitan municipalities have assumed the position 
of the higher authority and have been able to overrule district municipalities’ decision making; 
for example, in declaring some areas to be transformation areas (TA)6. While the lower tier 
district municipalities have been given power to define transformation project areas (based on 
law no. 5366 enacted in 2005, and still needs to get approved by metropolitan municipalities) 
for any derelict and ‘obsolescent’ areas within protection zones, because none of these laws 
and bylaws were set within a holistic framework there are large opportunities for the 
municipalities to manipulate TA projects in their favour (Demirtas-Milz, 2013; Kuyucu & 
Unsal, 2010). In addition to the changes already outlined, there were further interventions in 
                                                          
6 The significance of law no. 5216 for this research is its widened scope, whereby some of the main areas of authority belonging to district 
municipalities are transferred over to metropolitan municipalities (that is, for plan preparation - approval and implementation). The 
significance of law no. 5393 lies in its article 73, regarding TA declarations, where municipalities are given the authority of declaring sites 
of at least 50,000m² within their border as ‘Urban Transformation and Development Areas’. The significance of law no. 5998 is in its 
proposal of some changes to Municipality Law on issues such as the declaration of urban transformation sites, authorizing metropolitan 
municipalities to overrule district municipalities on this matter. 
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2011 when two new by-laws (nos 644 and 648)7 were enacted in urban development legislation, 
proposing that the central government (Environment and Urbanism Ministry) is now 
authorized to overrule all the district and metropolitan municipalities. Thus, the process of 
decentralization was reversed and the central government re-centralized the administrative 
hierarchy for planning. The central government via its ministries has therefore empowered 
itself with the authorization to overrule local governments (both metropolitan or district), 
leading to a monopolization of power (Erder & Incioglu, 2013; Ersoy, 2011).  
The ongoing restructuring and further neo-liberalization attempts, especially 2000 onwards 
also created unique linkages of patronage. They also reinforced the power of the mayoralty and 
fortified alliances between the power-holders of the statutory sector and the holders of capital, 
whereby the former used their powers and options under the regulations to provide conditions 
favouring the latter. Thus, both sides benefit and achieve their goals, while a similar situation 
applies to cultivating relationships with cabinet ministers, a form of social capital that paves 
the way to speculative deals in real estate (Helvacioglu, 2000; Uzun, 2007). These linkages 
have been generated across different sections of society, creating new elites, for example, most 
recently anti-Kemalist8 conservative counter-elites (Bank & Karadag, 2013), also called ‘new 
liberal intellectual elites’ (Eraydin & Tasan-Kok, 2014). It further generated pro-capitalist 
public–private partnerships including new business associations, which take an active role ‘in 
formulating domestic and regional policy initiatives’ (Bank & Karadag, 2012, p. 11). Most 
recently, the government’s organic linkages are strongly dependent on these sections of society 
and they ‘cooperate most successfully within the municipalities under AKP control’, and 
therefore have ‘vast patronage capacities at [their] disposal’ (ibid.; Bank & Karadag, 2013). 
This aggressive, hybrid neoliberal restructuring and further deregulation of the institutional 
frameworks and legislative conditions (enacting new laws and by-laws), while generating a 
good climate for entrepreneurial urban development, had irreversible impacts on urban 
development and for both the built and natural environments (Balaban, 2012; Penbecioglu & 
Tasan-Kok 2016). In other words, the aggressive interventionist style of the government and 
                                                          
7 Both by-laws are concerned with the organization and duties of the new ‘Environment and Urbanism Ministry’ and widening the scope of 
the Ministry’s powers. From the date of these new by-laws onwards, the Ministry would have the authority to carry out plan preparation, 
approval, implementation, issue building licenses and occupation licenses, thereby giving the Ministry all levels of authorisation for urban 
development and according to some commentators, turning it into a second TOKI (Mass Housing Administration – have been quite 
popular on the matters of housing and land provisions) that acts like a one big municipality for the whole country. In this regard, there is 
an interesting link where the previous head of TOKI became the head of the mentioned Ministry (CUP; 2011) who was later (in 2013) 
accused of corruption and resigned in relation to these claims.   
8 While Kemalism is associated with secularism and modernism, anti-Kemalism is usually identified with Islamist and conservative thoughts 
and therefore this line of thought is associated with anti-Kemalists. 
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its institutions,9 such as selling off public lands, gentrification, image projects as electoral 
promises, and land use changes through serial local plans,10 continued to generate its own 
unique powers and power relations at full pace (Balaban, 2012; Eraydın & Tasan-kok, 2014), 
which are in turn reflected in urban politics11  and planning practices.  Ironically, all these laws 
and by-laws (accumulating in number day by day), rather than generating a strict statutory 
environment for urban planning and urban development, provide a flexible structure amenable 
to tactical moves for by-passing any institutional or legislative obstacles that might potentially 
arise. Therefore, the two key words for Turkish urban development appear to be 
‘interventionalist’ and ‘entrepreneurial’, which is rather different from the classic capitalist 
hegemonic relations of the West: it is neither solely top-down nor merely corrupted, but rather 
provides a hybrid model, where top-down authoritarian power merges with horizontal 
patronage and individuals’ networking capacities, constantly generating new opportunities for 
the power holders, while acting to produce the power holders themselves. 
 
4. The case studies 
The introduction of shopping malls, transformation in the retail sector, and changes in the built 
environment follow a parallel pattern, owing to the political and economic restructuring and 
related events of the historical periods presented in the previous section. The rapid 
transformation of the retail sector and the emergence of shopping malls during the last 20 years 
through neo-liberal restructuring policies and their impacts on the built environment, have been 
investigated by a wide variety of researchers (Erkip, 2003, 2005; Kompil and Celik, 2009; 
Ozuduru et al., 2014; Tokatli and Boyaci, 1998, 1999). Within that period, the corporate power 
of public and private partnerships became apparent (Erkip, 2005). However, despite the 
attraction of international interest, the majority of commercial property investments initially 
remained internally-driven, due to the strength of local capital, the regulatory system, and the 
extended process of neo-liberal transition (Tasan-Kok, 2003) linked to the emerging elites. 
The capital city of Turkey, Ankara, had a population of around 5,350,000 by 2016 and, unlike 
the old Ottoman capital of Istanbul, it was considered a planned city, due to the development 
                                                          
9 Not only Metropolitan municipalities but also ministries and TOKI (Mass Housing Administration) that was initially established to provide 
affordable housing yet became a land provision office for private projects or luxurious profit-oriented projects more particularly 2000 
onwards. 
10 Each, when faced with opposition, was superficially redesigned as a tactical move.    
11 Especially in the Turkish case, where corruption claims emerged in 2013 involving significant government figures, including the former 
Minister of Environment and Urban Planning, who was pressured to resign, after which he stated that ‘a significant proportion’ of the 
construction projects and state bids under legal investigation after the corruption claims had been approved by the former Prime Minister; 
therefore, according to him, the Prime Minister should also resign (BBC Euro News, 2013)  
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interventions implemented since its elevation to capital city status in 1923. However, while the 
country has its own dynamics, Ankara, in turn, on a smaller scale, has taken a unique 
development pathway. Since having been elevated to the role of capital city, Ankara has always 
been a representative of the country and a centre for public affairs and the bureaucracy, and 
therefore, vulnerable to commodification through urban development strategies and power 
struggles. The development of retail areas has emerged as a problematic issue in planning, as 
there has not been any particular retail development or planning strategy produced at national 
or local level. Development has occurred in an ad hoc manner through city centre development 
or organic yet unplanned development on the ground floors of residential apartment blocks.  
Since the 1990s, Ankara has experienced an excessive development westward (towards the 
main West axis; see Figure 1). Originally aimed to relieve the congested city centre, this has 
been associated with significant decentralization of high and mid income groups to new, more 
desirable housing areas. In the wake of this, there has been significant celebration of the 
introduction of shopping malls as the products of progress and modernity.  
The aim of this paper is to provide a picture of planning practice in relation to hegemonic power 
relations rather than to illustrate the development of retail in the city but as the investigation of 
power relations and planning practice is a delicate issue, the selection of cases for the study 
raised some challenges. The initial aim was to uncover planning practice through a 
chronological perspective of mall production for the country, and therefore schemes 
representative of different time periods (i.e. the most recent, the oldest and mid-term periods 
of planning) were selected from Ankara. However, during the fieldwork, it was discovered that 
the early era (before 2000s) of mall production was generally unproblematic and welcomed at 
both national and local level and therefore did not raise particular issues for investigation. 
Therefore, the focus of the study was redirected towards contemporary examples, since initial 
investigation suggested that these might well uncover more challenging and contentious issues, 
and therefore two recent malls were selected for the study, both of which were complete and 
fully operative by the time of the fieldwork of the research 2011-2012:12 these were Kentpark 
mall and Armada I and II (the latter being the extension to the first Armada mall), both located 
in the above-mentioned West axis (see Figure 1). Initial communications with planners in the 
                                                          
12 Within the given time of the fieldwork and pilot study analysis, Armada I and II, and Kentpark came to the fore. Armada in its initial 
project (opened in 2002) represented the mid-term in the history of the city’s malls, which begun in 1989 with Atakule mall. Kentpark 
(opened in 2010) and Armada II (in 2012) were selected as representatives of the recent historical period; both were subject to challenges 
in their development process. Therefore, these two provided temporally and practically rich material for investigation. We also considered 
other selection criteria including location, size and theme. It should be noted that after the completion of the field work, other mall 
developments came to light with the potential to provide interesting insights, namely the malls known as Next Level, Taurus, Podium and 
the upcoming “New Atakule”. 
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municipality also made clear that urban power relations and conflicts among actors 
(administrative and non-administrative) had been emerging significantly in the Çankaya region 
due to high real estate and land values, which added to the general popularity of the area; 
therefore, location become an important criterion for case study selection. The study took a 
mixed methods qualitative approach and this paper is based on findings from interviews and 
archival documentation.  While an initial stakeholder mapping exercise was conducted early in 
the study in order to identify key interviewees, other important sources of information only 
became apparent after undertaking this investigation (See Figure 2). Therefore, stakeholder 
identification became a matter of continual review and update.  
In total, 16 interviews were conducted with the planning departments of the relevant 
municipalities as well as with council members, deputy mayors, architects, managers of the 
malls, head of Chamber of Urban Planners (CUP), lawyers of the courts involved with the 
planning processes, and the expert assigned by the court. Some of the interviews were recorded 
and fully transcribed, although direct quotes contained in the paper have been anonymized to 
maintain confidentiality. 
Power relations that ‘are too complex to be accounted’ and are ‘of a pre-modern kind that could 
not be defended publicly’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 2) were the main challenge in this study. This was 
because these relations were antagonistic and involved particular methods and tactics in dealing 
with situations involving conflict. In addition, the individual relations and negotiations that are 
carried out beyond formal processes are hard to track and near impossible to prove. Therefore, 
court documents have been used both as a guide and as a way to track those alliances and 
relations and attitudes among the actors. Every publicly available document and petition was 
investigated, together with consultancy documentation sourced from assigned lawyers, 
therefore, substantial information was gathered and assessed. However, even then, some 
information that might have been used was in practice restricted, through self-censorship, as 
one interview stated:  
There is a lot more to tell but that cannot go into any kind of academic research, it is 
beyond that, these relations are beyond an academic investigation. (Lawyer of 
CCCAA13).  
 
                                                          
13 The NGO called Contemporary Capital City Ankara Association is a civil association consisting of lawyers who aim to follow up planning 
decisions in the city, and present themselves as the representatives of the public interest.  
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4.1. Spatial planning procedures and practices in action 
The two cases, Armada and Kentpark, reveal the challenges, complexities and conflicts 
involved in the real practices of planning for private developments in Turkish cities. Both cases 
were initiated by what is referred to as a plan modification.14 This is common practice for 
developments in urban areas, and generally comes from either a single investor or from a 
private company (developer). Then the approval process continues with the assessment of the 
proposal by the planning department of the relevant municipality, which later obtains final 
approval from the council through a vote of the councillors15 of the approving authority. If any 
problems are raised, the proposals at this stage are then passed to the Planning Commission for 
further consultation. During this period, the commission delivers an assessment report, 
although it is the council who decide whether to issue a final decision in line with the 
commission or not. After the approval of the plan by the council, there is a period of one month 
in which any objections should be raised in the format of a formal petition. The main conflicts 
and disputes start during the secondary objection process (a period of 60 days after the initial 
30 days) if a lawsuit is entered against the approval in order to suspend (or cancel) the project. 
The lawsuit may be entered by an NGO or Civil Association, or even an individual. In Ankara, 
it is usually the district municipalities, the Chamber of Urban Planners (CUP16) or the NGO 
Contemporary Capital City Ankara Association (CCCAA), who raise objections and enter 
lawsuits.17 This is also the phase in which complex power relations surface, where in the 
selected cases, the conflicts alluded to above were manifested during the processes of plan 
approval, post-approval and implementation. In both cases, the post-approval processes were 
followed by judicial conflict, where either CCCAA, CUP or relevant district municipalities 
entered one or several lawsuits, due to the delivery of an initial formal objection or request for 
a revision on the plan being rejected by the metropolitan municipality.  
                                                          
14 Although in the Turkish planning system, there are several scales of plans, master plans and implementation plans, starting from the 
national scale and continuing with the regional scale, the general custom for the operation of planning in practice is through ‘plan 
modifications’. This is where a new plan is proposed to represent the modifications and the changes for the existing approved previous 
plan, usually on a parcel scale, aiming for an increase in building rights or a plan border extension or a land use change. 
15 The selection of the councillors can be explained in relation to the two-tier mode of the local government system (district municipalities 
and metropolitan municipalities), whereby mayors are elected through a majoritarian system, and council members are elected through a 
proportional representation system (with regard to local elections). There is, however, a 10% threshold and quota member calculation to 
strengthen the executive power, namely that of the mayor (as the members belonging to the mayor’s party hold the majority while the 
other party members stay as minorities). The basic qualification for eligibility as a candidate for election as a council member is to be over 
25 and to have a minimum degree of education (to be at least a primary school graduate). 
16 The Chamber of Urban Planners (CUP) has a legal status emanating from The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects 
(UCTEA). By law, the UCTEA and institutions affiliated to UCTEA are defined as corporate bodies and professional organizations acting in 
the form of a public institution.  
17 For different cases such as higher scale regional plan approvals, decisions against such as mining activities or against to the changes in 
the planning regulations, other chambers, that is, Civil Engineers, Landscape Architects, Environmental Engineers Forestry Engineers, 
Survey Engineers, have also been entering lawsuits.  
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4.2. Echoing and introducing the actors: relations and pseudo-participation  
Before going into the detailed planning procedures of the selected cases, it is vitally important 
to show the actors and their perceptions of the planning profession and of each other in general 
terms. In Turkish legislation, it is not mandatory18 for municipal authorities or private 
developers to include consultancy or seek the participation of professional representatives, 
NGOs, or citizens in the planning process. Such representation therefore, takes place only 
within the framework of conflict and thereby the purpose of such consultation is synonymized 
with the act of ‘opposition’ and expressing disapproval. This influences decision-makers’ 
perception of civil action, regarding this as being undertaken merely for the purpose of 
opposing any development. So, these actors denounce the NGOs and particularly CUP as 
‘stubborn and raising opposition merely to be obstinate’, as stated by the Directorate of the 
Planning Department of the Metropolitan Municipality (Directorate_AMM - see Figure 2 for 
actors). This opinion was also echoed by the council member interviewed: 
The CUP and other organizations should participate of course, but only if only they are 
going to give positive critiques, not negative. If you are going to give a negative critique 
why would I invite you? The Chambers are just being stubborn, only aiming to object 
against whatever is done. (Councillor_AMM).   
Turkish planning practice assigns greater authority to council members and their opinions have 
a higher status than that of planners, even though they often have little proficiency in planning 
matters. Indeed, the backgrounds of council members are often such that they are typically 
builders, tradesmen, business managers and civil engineers therefore generates tendency to 
perceive all development positively. Many are directly connected to the construction industry 
and those members ‘have a tendency to approve all the plans which accelerate the construction 
sector without any limitation or evaluation about whether the plan is good or bad’ (Kilinc et al. 
2009, p.73). Urban development is therefore, generally down to the decision-taking of pro-
development councillors, who often regard planning profession and its representatives with 
suspicion.   
                                                          
18 Among the very few regulations that refer to public meetings as a requirement are Environmental Assessment Projects, Conservation 
Law, and Municipality Law (asking for City councils to be established that are distinct from municipal councils; contrary to the latter, they 
would have no powers of authorisation). Other legislation usually focuses on taking into consideration the opinion of the other public 
institutions in order to avoid any unintentional damage to their interests. Therefore, there is no obligation in obtaining public opinion in 
the planning process, only after the process completed approved plans are usually announced. 
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Author: But not everyone in the council is a planning professional or has planning 
knowledge, do they? 
Councillor_AMM: No, they know, I mean it is the experience of years of being a 
council member, everyone has learnt what’s what, and they don’t need a degree for that. 
Who are experts?19 They are just academics. Think! The municipality has 500 
employees and they gave a decision, then 3 academics are appointed by the courts to 
challenge that decision. How many plans have these academics done in real life? You 
can’t think everything is for the public interest … The experts should also investigate 
the daily conditions of how much money was spent for that investment, how many 
people will be suffering from their decision. 
Directorate_AMM: You academics!  You put obstacles in the way of everything, in the 
way of every investment. 
The AMM Council members and other empowered actors are also highly-politicized and 
usually act in accordance with the prevalent political position. Thus, they are more concerned 
with reflecting a particular political stance than in echoing the public or any other non-
governmental actors’ concerns. This is in contrast to planners working in the same institution 
who are often relaxed about criticizing the political position their authority takes. However, it 
is not simply two conflicting sides consisting of the ruling political party versus the opposition. 
The process includes a complexity of relations and networks, management and domination of 
urban land and a high amount of capital invested in urban space, which is prone to speculation 
and works similarly to a stock market. In essence, any objectivity of the planning profession is 
undermined by the daily practicalities of conflicts. 
Some of the gossip against us came also from CHP (the main opposition party) 
as some of them were thinking we would reach some political position via our 
actions. We told them then you should continue to the courts. They are opposing 
things that cost a million dollars but they don’t take any serious step and enter 
a lawsuit. Therefore, it is not just matter of AKP or CHP. (Lawyer_CCCAA). 
The architectural project approvals are being done here in our municipality ... 
the municipality can resist and state that ‘no, I will not permit a shopping mall 
                                                          
19 Experts are usually selected among planning academics or planners working in other public institutions. 
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in this zone’. However, has there been too much resistance like this up till now? 
The situation seems pretty obvious. (Planner_CM). 
The selected cases also highlight the use of Bourdieu’s credential capital, a type of social capital 
that is built up through group membership and allows members to participate in the credit, in 
its various meanings, accorded to the group. However, the use of credit is not limited to the 
relation between the developer (proposer) and decision-makers (approving authority): some 
planners have also become active participants in power relations, with a tendency to accept any 
job for monetary and networking benefits. This was also recognised in the interviews, once it 
had been identified through the investigation of the municipal archive,20 the Turkey Trade 
Registry Journal21 and interviews:  
Obviously, these kinds of plans are prepared by certain names. However, it is not 
because of powerful economic capital relations. It is a kind of closeness to the authority. 
‘Whose plans are able to get approval from this municipality without a problem?’ This 
question is a frequent advertisement tool for those names. (Head of CUP). 
In addition, as reflected through the words of powerless planners, the process embodied an 
alliance between the approving institution and private developer (the proposing side), while the 
planning system was largely bypassed, as expressed by one planner: 
Ever since the beginning of the first planning experience, the rulings of plans were 
undermined. This might happen even more nowadays … At the implementation of a 
plan, a request comes from an individual or friendship or old-boy network, such that 
the decision-makers in the municipality are not able to refuse the request. This is what 
usually happens. (Planner_AMM).  
On the side of the developer, clearly the gain is in attaining a smooth development path without 
challenge by the legislative process. 
There wasn’t even any inauguration system like that before … At the local level, we 
know that these amenities are personal and tailor-made, specially adjusted according 
to the circumstances by saying ‘as long as you make this investment, I’ll do the rest in 
the care of state’s potentials [power]’. (Deputy_CM). 
                                                          
20 It has been recognised by the researcher that the recent plans for the Armada and Kentpark, which have been subjected to opposition 
and continued court processes, were prepared by the same planner. 
21 The Turkey Trade Registry Journal is a journal for investor groups and companies and some of the information they share is related to 
who are the investors and if the investment group is merging with another group and similar items.    
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Although his view was shared by the planners from both the AMM and district municipalities, 
who do not have authority to participate in decision making, the decision-makers think that all 
developments should be welcomed because they raise employment and taxes to be returned to 
the public benefit.   
4.3. The implicit drivers in the process, behind doors and bending the rules: planning 
practice in action 
The Armada mall commenced construction in 1999 and was completed and opened to its users 
in 2002; then as a reaction to a highly competitive market, a second phase of development 
(Armada II), was constructed 2012. The West axis of Ankara has been significantly developed 
through the 1990 Ankara Master Plan, where Armada, along with most of the West axis, were 
ascribed the land use category of SA (Services Area22), where through piecemeal modification 
attempts were made to alter plan proposals to increase building rights. The initial modification 
plan approved by the municipality in 1992 allowed two separate developments on separate land 
parcels with a green pedestrian link (with public ownership status) in between (see Figure 3 - 
ALLE). However, in 1998, land owners proposed a modification for increased building rights for 
a denser construction, stating that the adjacent parcels (that belonged to another district authority) 
had much higher rights and this placed the site at a disadvantage. That proposal was approved 
quickly and enabled the construction of Armada I, which became operational as a mall in 2002. 
There were no further changes in the process until 2008, when a new plan modification was 
suggested which included the development of nearby plots. This development was entirely 
characterised as an urban transformation area - TA by the developers (see Figure 423) since such 
declarations have recently become a new tradition for easing the approval process for large 
developments. However, initially the proposal was not approved by the Ankara Metropolitan 
Municipality (AMM) stating that the planning notes24 in the declaration are overlapping and 
conflict with higher scale plans. For instance, the latest higher scale Master Plan of Ankara (Plan 
2023) proposed CBD use on the north of the Eskisehir Highway, while the particular planning 
notes of the recent proposal for the Armada site used an SA characterisation (as did the old Master 
Plan of Ankara) and proposed additional residential uses. In addition, the south part of the new 
proposal was already located in another transformation project (Cukurambar TA projects) that 
had prior approval. Another matter was the construction calculations, in which the connecting 
                                                          
22 SA enables the uses of public institutions, tourist, health, cultural, recreational and commercial facilities, showrooms and dormitories. 
23 Red marked area is where Armada located yet whole TA Project is hatched in black and bordered with black dots 
24 Planning notes are particular notes and need to be presented with the plan proposal and in the report of the plan, and in some cases, 
confer higher validity than relevant legislation. 
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bridges (see Figure 5) and below-ground constructions were not included in the development 
calculation. This was highlighted by the planning commission of the Metropolitan Municipality 
and referred as unfair – a hidden gain. 
The same architectural company proposed another plan modification in late 2011, this time only 
referring to the Armada and the adjacent plot for Armada II. In this case, however exactly the 
same planning notes for the proposal that had been previously declined were used for the new 
proposal, regardless of the adverse report of the planning department of the AMM. The proposal 
was conditionally25 approved by the AMM council in 2012. In the meantime, the Chamber of 
Urban Planners (CUP) entered a lawsuit against the approval, objecting to some of the planning 
notes, which according to them were seeking ‘tailor made’ adjustments:  
… the subject of the court carries the purpose of ‘tailor made’ adjustments and the 
purpose of giving increases is personal; these adjustments are contradictory to the public 
interest and against the by-law of Type Building for Planned Areas (Lawsuit petition of 
CUP,26 for the court numbered 2012/854 emphasis is original). 
An antagonistic line of communication commenced between the AMM and CUP through the 
conflicting lawsuit, where the AMM focused their defence on three main matters, two of which 
were not concerned with the project itself but merely criticized CUP, and the third focussed on 
the bridges. The criticism of the AMM was directed towards the legal position of the CUP in 
court, maintaining that the CUP should not be able to enter a lawsuit on the matter since they 
wouldn’t sustain any direct benefit or loss in the area.  While the lawsuit was still pending, the 
implementation plan was quickly approved by the AMM council to enable the construction to 
start. What is more, the vital negotiations were carried out between developer and the 
Metropolitan Municipality, effectively excluding the district municipality from the decision-
making process and declining any form of district municipality representation. This exclusion is 
normalized according to councillors of AMM:  
I wish they wouldn’t be obstinate on these things, because at the end of the day they are 
just a district municipality. (Councillor_MM). 
                                                          
25 Here the condition was that the company should build a school in one of the transformation projects run by the Metropolitan 
Municipality in a different district, on a ‘turn-key’ basis. The ‘turn-key’ basis implies that the company would have to complete and hand in 
the key to the new building, as agreed with the municipality (in this case the school of the other TA project), before they can be granted an 
occupation permit for the mall. 
26 The CUP challenged a number of issues, namely, the linking bridge between Armada I and Armada II; the note that provided the 
freestanding transfer of the building rights between the plots and excluded the underground construction from the overall construction 
calculations; the misuse of the ‘plan modification’ option in the legislation; and the appropriateness of the scale of the plan. 
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Kentpark started construction in 2006, reached completion in 2009 and opened in 2010. The area 
had originally been used by an agricultural machinery and equipment firm (ORMAK); later it 
was used as a car showroom (of Fiat-Tofas automobiles); and later its ownership status changed 
and the new proposals for mall construction emerged. Compared to the Armada case, Kentpark’s 
conflicts and complexities were more in the planning process. The planning process for the 
Kentpark shopping centre started in 2005 and since that time, up to 2011, the approvals of plans 
for the mall have been subjected to 10 different lawsuits in total. Each plan approval for the site 
was faced with a lawsuit, entered either by CUP or CCCAA or by the CM; and all were in 
opposition to the AMM as the approving authority.  
The mall proposal came first came forward in 2005 via two different plans both approved by the 
AMM on the same day. One proposed a gigantic structure repesenting Nasreddin Hoca (a 
traditional sage from Turkish history) which would also be used as a commercial-cultural centre 
run by the municipality; it also proposed increased building rights and an additional residential 
area in the project. The second proposal, on the other hand, was to support the first proposal by 
categorising the area as a TA (Figure 627), in order that total planning control would lay with the 
AMM. Following their approval both proposals were faced with different lawsuits entered by 
CUP, CCCAA and CM. However, as per the usual custom while the lawsuits were in process, an 
implementation plan was prepared and quickly approved by the AMM in order to begin on the 
construction in 2006. From this point onwards, new proposals28 were quickly put forward and 
given immediate approval as a tactic: while one approval was subjected to lawsuit, the subsequent 
approval would enable construction to continue. For instance, the process that started in 2005 
with the declaration of TA status and approval for the gigantic statue, allowing the accompanying 
cultural-commercial centre was followed up with a declaration of CBD while the lawsuit 
pertaining to the previous approval was still pending. Afterwards the CBD declaration was also 
subject to a lawsuit and the site was declared to be a TA once more (although without a statue 
this time); and yet again, this position has been the subject of further lawsuits.  
It is worth mentioning here that the construction of a statue of Nasreddin Hoca, as one of the 
popular historical-cultural folk characters of the nation, was one of the electoral promises made 
by the Mayor in 2004. It was included as part of his campaign programme to transform the city 
                                                          
27 Note that the two plans seem almost identical, the only difference in the plan drawings are the SA hatching and TA title: ‘Kentsel 
Donusum ve Gelisim Proje Alani’. Within the current planning system, although there are different scales and purposes of planning, most 
of them have the same spatial language on paper, while the planning notes (which can be easily changed and can be context-specific) may 
be the only element making a difference between planning levels. 
28 However, each of the new plan proposals usually includes either the same the planning notes or similar ones with minor changes, even 
though these had been the main focus of objections for the lawsuits. 
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centre as a site for tourism: ‘Within Gokcek’s [the Mayor’s]  touristic Ankara there would be 
these wonders: a 180m tall flagpole which would stand together with a restaurant and belvedere 
spaces in the Ankara Citadel; at the five entrances of the city, five different statues, each of which 
would be 50 m tall, statues of Ataturk, Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Nasreddin Hoca and Semazen, ten 
museums, a natural park which would include models of all animals in the world, a bird island, 
two zoos and a 1,700,000m² shopping mall’ (Radikal News, 2004).  
Four years after the initial approval, due to emerging conflicts reflected in the media some 
newspapers reported on the matter, quoting the mayor with regard to his intentions: 
It has come out that the project, where the building rights increased 14 times and the land rent 
became 1.5 billion Turkish Liras, was defended by the Mayor, as he stated: ‘these friends have 
promised me that they will build my dream, the Nasreddin Hoca statue, that’s why I increased 
the building rights. They should take it with my blessings and enjoy it [helali hos olsun]’, 
with reference to the plan that was approved in 2005. (Segmen, Hurriyet News, 2009, emphasis 
added). 
For such lawsuits, the court consults with experts, who in the above-mentioned instances, 
generally contributed to a decision for suspension of construction which is usually followed by 
a final court decision of full rejection of plan approval. However, in the meantime and due to 
the long court procedures, construction continued at full flow, either based on the new 
implementation plans (each approved very quickly if the previous one had been subjected to a 
court case) and to construction and building permits. In the case of Kentpark, nearly all 
approvals faced with court conflicts ended with rejection or suspension of plan approval, but 
meanwhile the mall had already been constructed, based on new proposals and building 
permits, and finally, one last strategy was proposed by the developer and approved by the 
AMM in 2011 in order to by-pass the ultimate rejection by the court. This time, as the 
construction was already finished and the mall had started to operate, the main purpose of that 
new proposal was aimed at legalizing the current structures on the site, since the planning notes 
stated: the ‘current status of the site is the planning status of the site’, 29 meaning: whatever 
structure is on the plot would be treated as the legalized planning status through a provided 
plan. Another lawsuit was entered by the CUP against that final attempt, and although once 
more the experts and the court were against the latest planning approval, no sanction was issued 
for the completed mall and the project is still fully operational, with only the residential part of 
                                                          
29 This term was used against squatter areas in 1990s to legalize their condition via reclamation plans. Since then it has become a life-
jacket for municipalities, that can be used to legalize an already constructed site. 
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the project uncompleted. The situation in Armada and especially in Kentpark (see the Figure 
7) reveals an insuperable coalition of the allied forces of power holders, involved in constant 
tactical manoeuvres and anticipating possible constraints (Foucault, 1994; Hillier, 2002). 
However, this also illustrates that even the different institutions of state and their actions may 
clash and ultimately, the networked power of the decision-makers has the capacity to go beyond 
the supremacy of law. There, in the decision-making process, the crafting or relaxation of 
legislation (Flybjerg & Richardson 2002; Oncu, 1988) or veiled Mafiosi force majeure over 
the state (Chubb 1982) have become both the producer and the product of the power relations. 
 
5. Results: the powerful reality of planning 
The case studies shed light on several important matters for the Turkish planning system. 
Firstly, it is argued that power in the everyday practice of urban space development has the 
ability to lead and to manipulate different types of capital while simultaneously producing 
them and being the product of them. Actual power and its relations are generated when they 
free themselves from their visible image (i.e. domination, oppression and repression) (Foucault, 
1980), meaning the power and relations bounded by it actually operate when they are least 
observable. In the cases studied, there was a form of disguised power in play, which is not 
evident when looking solely at the formal documentation of the planning process, but requires 
deeper investigation30 and interactions.  
Secondly, the study suggested that the representation of power in Turkey works two ways in 
the process: the institutional (internal) representation that is built up through hierarchies in the 
authorization process and is overlaid on traditional structures; and an individualistic non-
institutional representation that is built up through the interrelations of networks of external 
actors with internal actors. Therefore, the planning process and power operating in the 
background do not merely present a top-down process and nor anything resembling a bottom-
up participatory process, but rather they exercise horizontal connections through the 
cooperation between both market and top-down decision-making mechanisms.  
Third, beyond the visible powerful condition of decision-makers, depending on their position 
in a case, planners can be powerful or powerless, while similar conditions apply to the state 
institutions, which might be empowered or silenced. Even the most powerful statutory 
                                                          
30 It is also important to emphasize here that if the researcher herself had not had her own personal network (her own social capital) in the 
planning community at the municipal level, it would have been almost impossible to collect all the data for this research.  
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instruments, institutions and their decisions (law and courts) may be circumvented if necessary, 
since although there have been rejections from the courts, there has been no interruption in 
practice on the site or any sanction imposed for disregarding the court’s decision. There, the 
allied relationship between decision-makers and developers; the pseudo-participation of some 
and non-participation of the rest of the actors; the crafting of statutory tools in response to 
individuals’ demands (Flybjerg & Richardson, 2002; Oncu, 1988) reveal how the dark side of 
power operates in reality and how the hypocrisy within planning practices condoned by 
beneficiaries are uncovered. The participation is termed ‘pseudo’ because it occurs only if the 
process includes a legal challenge and any chance to construct communication only emerges 
during conflict. It is also because, even if the secondary actors are able to represent the interests 
of a wider population, the representation is superficial and ineffective. Moreover, the prevailing 
perception of those with real power taking decisions within government is that planning is 
something of an unnecessary inconvenience. Planners in Turkey therefore operate in a system 
that is worlds away from the West-derived communicative or participatory planning theory, 
where planners are seen as mediators in the development process. Thus, communicative 
planning seems too ‘idealized’ (Yiftachael, 1998), or rather romantic and utopian due to tacit 
mechanisms and taken for granted assumptions (Knieling & Othengrafen, 2015). In essence, 
planning in Turkey is seen as a ‘rubber-stamping’ exercise for the purpose of obtaining 
legitimacy for a project; and even this is often considered unnecessary. Because the state’s 
monopoly on authorisation allows it powers of intervention, this endows it with manifold 
patronage capacities.  As has become apparent from the case studies, conflict emerges as an 
alternative path for communication between actors, who are capable of crafting legislation and 
have the capacity to generate relationships of alliance (between decision-makers and private 
associates) through their capital power. The perceptions the actors have of each other also 
contribute to the powerfulness or the powerlessness of others. The different groups of actors 
also become defined and their roles delineated by the stereotypes that each group holds about 
others.  The statements of the decision-makers expose a clear antagonism towards others, 
shaped by mistrust. They also indicate a complete disregard for the notion of an unbiased 
planning profession in particular. 
The result is that planning praxis in Turkey is distinct from the kinds of procedures envisaged 
in idealistic Western-centric communicative theories in having a magnified focus on the 
approval process. In most cases this is a process characterised by government interventions, 
such as tactical actions to bend rules for developers, who face little challenge in pushing their 
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proposals through; while the resultant developments are promoted to local communities as 
‘public services’, although the chance of exercising the right to participation is diminished, the 
voices of external actors (mostly representatives of the public) are silenced and claims  about 
the supremacy of law have become rhetorical. Therefore, the gap between theory and reality 
has been widened and all indicators suggest that in Turkish planning praxis, this gap is 
widening further, and the civil voice is becoming increasingly negligible, with an ever-
decreasing sense of the presence of actual civil power. 
6. Concluding remarks: planning a powerful tool or a merely rhetoric? 
Power relations are an essential driving force that constantly subject the reality of practice to 
their own rules, while simultaneously inflicting distortions upon the widely-accepted purpose 
of spatial planning via decision-making processes. Although it is quite logical to assume that 
if the dark side of planning can manifest itself in Denmark, as in an example given by 
Flyvbjerg, or if the reality of planning often disappoints even in Australia (as exemplified by 
Hillier, 2002), or in other countries that are ‘developed’ and where there is relatively higher 
trust in government, then it should come as no surprise to find these aspects of planning in 
Turkey; especially in relation to large developments like shopping malls. With regard to such 
matters, this paper is not claiming to discover something that is already known, but rather to 
expose the extent of such practices and conditions. Furthermore, the paper highlighted the 
operations of a government that adopts an interventionalist style, thereby increasing its 
capacities for patronage, and that also enables the deployment of different types of capital 
within this expanded patronage, which together generate conditions that are distinct from the 
classical hegemonic relations of capitalism. This paper aspires to read between the lines of this 
dialogue from the perspective of planning cultures and power relations discourse – critical to 
the communicative turn as a ‘dominant paradigm’ (Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995), since it “may 
only pertain to specific parts of the world where particular academic, professional and urban, 
institutional and local circumstances prevail” (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000, p.105). Thus, we 
require different ways of understanding planning experience as “specific relationships that 
connect global trends with local characteristics” (Caruso et al., 2016, p.219); de-
provincialisation of planning theories (Roy, 2009) and call for the importance of ‘planning 
cultures’ to be highlighted rather than compelling the realities of practice to be fitted into 
existing well-known planning theories. Since the evolutionary development of planning 
practices, structures and outcomes do not follow the same route universally, we suggest that 
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attention might be given to developing more adaptable and less prescriptive approaches, 
sensitive to the cultural nuances embedded within practices (Sanyal, 2005). 
In response to this paper’s position, it might reasonably be claimed that large investments like 
malls, where stakes for the developer are high, may not represent everyday planning practice; 
or some might consider that the distortions and hegemonic relations within planning practice 
revealed in our research are peculiar to commercial property driven urban development. We 
argue to the contrary, that although commercial property developments are one of the best 
examples for illustrating hegemonic relations, they are not the only such, and unfortunately 
similar practices are common throughout the Turkish planning system. Indicating this, since 
2006 there have been approximately 1,20031 court cases, (some still continuing), initiated either 
by CUP and/or Chamber of Architects (CA) against plan modifications, a few even including 
sociological aspects such as terms of hatred,32 as claimed by CA (CA, 2016); and some 
featuring denunciations33 of the Mayor made by the CUP or vice versa. Therefore, the 
situations and practices explained in this research, which over time develop into planning 
traditions, represent the dynamics of planning culture and are not merely specific to shopping 
mall development.  
A planning culture that includes the beneficiaries’ demands, the clashing of authorities, the 
lack of transparency, the ineffectual enforcement of legislation, an interventionalist style of 
government characterised by obsession with the built environment and ‘at-any-cost’ urban 
development paves the way for the planning system to be disregarded in practice. Overall, the 
struggles in urban space power games, while being reshaped via the interrelations of powerful 
actors and their tactical actions, also have the effect of incapacitating powerless opponents, 
who are further weakened by the degradation of perceptions of planning principles and ethics. 
Conflict becomes the only means of communication in such planning cultures, therefore the 
essence of communication as foregrounded in communicative theories becomes riven with 
strains and malfunctions, by contrast with the ideal of communicative planning.  
 
                                                          
31 CA published 600 on their website (some for the same place) and CUP published 637 in their bulletin by 2016; while a number of others 
were opened by other engineering chambers. 
32 The Mayor, speaking of a different urban transformation project, stated that ‘within in this new site conservative families will live’. CA 
claimed that this was a term of hatred. as for them this statement refers to segregation within society, through valuing conservatives over 
non-conservatives. 
33 The recent event where the Mayor stated that if CUP enters one more lawsuit against any plan he will claim a denunciation and CUP’s 
reply ‘he shouldn’t wait a moment and should claim that denunciation he mentions with regard to the 637 lawsuits that are already in 
process’, (CUP, 2017) clearly presents an antagonistic relation between the two actors, where one side is a politically powerful individual 
and the other side is an institution with semi-public status 
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